

MELINDA A. ROBERTS

Department of Philosophy, Religion and Classical Studies
Bliss 112 | The College of New Jersey | Ewing NJ 08628
609 771 2348 (O)
robertsm@tcnj.edu

EDUCATION AND HONORS

Institute for Futures Studies (IFFS), Stockholm, Sweden

Member of core research team for the IFFS project *Climate Ethics and Future Generations*
September 2018-2024

Princeton University

Lawrence S. Rockefeller Fellowship (University Center for Human Values), September 2015-June 2016

University of Texas School of Law, Austin, Texas

J.D., 1986, General Honors
Dean's Award (first in class) in Law and Medicine
Dean's Award (first in class) in Marital Relations and Divorce
Best Note Award (*Review of Litigation*)
Licensed and admitted to practice of law in New York and New Jersey (currently inactive)

Five College Ph.D. Program (University of Massachusetts at Amherst), Amherst, Massachusetts

Ph.D., Philosophy, 1983
Dissertation: *Psychological Criteria of Personal Identity* (Fred Feldman, advisor)
University Fellowship, 1980-82 (declined second year)

Vassar College, A.B. cum laude

Honors in Philosophy

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

The College of New Jersey, Ewing, New Jersey

Coordinating Pre-Law Advisor for the College, Feb. 2014-2022 (sabbatical leave 2015-16)
Chair of Department, Sept. 2012-July 2018 (sabbatical leave 2015-16)
Professor of Philosophy, Sept. 2005- (sabbatical leave 2008-2009; 2015-16; 2022-2023)
Associate Professor of Philosophy, 1999-2005 (sabbatical leave 2000-2001)
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, 1993-1999

Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York, New York

Associate, 1986-1993. Broker-dealer regulation, mergers and acquisitions and securities law

Lawrence University, Appleton Wisconsin

Assistant Professor of Philosophy, 1981-83

AREAS OF RESEARCH INTEREST

Specializations: Population Ethics, Climate Ethics, Consequentialism, Moral Theory, Philosophy of Law, Applied Ethics, Children's Rights, Intergenerational Justice, Law and Ethics

Concentrations: Logic; History of Modern Philosophy

COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH PROJECTS

Member of consulting research group for the *Population Wellbeing Initiative*, University of Texas at Austin. June 2022-.

Member of the core research group for project entitled *Climate Ethics and Future Generations* (program leaders Gustaf Arrhenius and Krister Bykvist). Funded by RIKSBANKENS JUBILEUMSFOND for five years commencing fall 2018. Work will take place at the Institute for Futures Studies, Oxford University, Stockholm University and elsewhere, in collaboration with the Oxford Martin School project on Human Rights for Future Generations, the Reading Leverhulme project on climate justice and the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital.

SCHOLARLY ACTIVITY

Books

Book—Accepted for publication

The Existence Puzzles: An Introduction to Population Ethics. Oxford University Press 2024 (available Jan. 26, 2024)

In recent years, population ethics has emerged as one of the most theoretically important and practically significant areas in moral philosophy. The problems of population ethics both challenge moral theories we previously considered compelling and throw into relief practical issues we as moral agents together face. This book is meant to investigate the problems of population ethics in a novel way, one that creates a platform in which professional philosophers, economists and others who come to the discussion with opposing and entrenched positions can begin to work toward a new and shared understanding of what a cogent, plausible theory of population should look like. Specifically, to facilitate an open-minded discussion, *The Existence Puzzles* avoids the method of presenting and defending a theory and then applying that theory to the stock problem cases. Rather, the book presents five *puzzles of existence*—five *genuine* puzzles, puzzles we all, including the author, sincerely find perplexing, puzzles we can't in advance see how to solve short of throwing out one of the puzzle pieces (an approach that in the end should satisfy no one). The book will leave readers with a partial population theory, a collection of principles that reflect our widely held, shared intuitions regarding our obligations in

respect of future generations but are at the same time sensitive to the formal constraints necessary to insure the consistency and cogency of any moral theory.

Books—In progress

Too Much of a Good Thing: Why Ethics Is on a Collision Course with Itself and What We Can Do About it Now.

This work focuses on the collision between climate ethics and population ethics, and argues that it's dominant views within the area of population ethics (include the uncritical acceptance of expected value theory and its unfortunate "fanatical" implications) that have gotten out of hand. We need a reversion – not to "common sense" morality – but to views able to sustain themselves against what appear to be clear counterexamples.

How We Read the Law

The problem of the indeterminacy of the law is long-standing, urgent and still unresolved. The purpose of *How We Read the Law* is to lay out the problem, critically explore one possible solution to the problem and then test that solution by applying it to three important issues currently before the Supreme Court: equal protection, voting rights and constitutional privacy.

As lawyers (the *legal realists*) from the 1930s on argued, legal texts generally do *not* come with clear meanings attached. At least: the most *important* among the texts that we think—*think*—govern our lives (e.g., the 1st, 14th and 15th Amendments) seem clearly *indeterminate*. That being so, and if we assume that there *is* a distinction between the *correct* judicial opinion and the *incorrect* judicial opinion, the need arises to say just what (so to speak) ties judges' hands. No credible answer to that question being immediately evident, judges would seem left to occupy a *highly* questionable role: that of *making* the law as they see fit, rather than of *reading* and *applying* the law that "we the people" have chosen for ourselves.

The problem of the indeterminacy of the law challenges the very possibility of democracy. It undermines the idea that *the people* have the authority to make the laws that bind us all. It suggests that, when we think—*think*—we are putting laws into place, all we are really doing is handing a blank slate to judges so that they can write out the laws *they* would like to put in place. Judges may not consciously take the law into their own hands. But that fact doesn't make the indeterminate determinate. The claim that the text of the law is often indeterminate—that the text alone *cannot* effectively tie judges' hands—remains compelling.

A Dialogue on the Nonidentity Problem

Intended for introductory courses in philosophy, this dialogue introduces students to the difficulties of spelling out the obligations we have in respect of future people, specifically in cases in which the choices we make may help to decide just *who* shall exist in the future.

Books—Published

Abortion and the Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons: Finding Middle Ground in Hard Cases (Springer 2010)

In this book, I argue that early abortion is ordinarily morally permissible whether chosen for a good reason, a bad reason or no reason at all and that very late abortion is ordinarily morally

wrong. Along the way, I acknowledge that people who never exist—whether as a result of non-conception or early abortion—have full moral status. But I also argue that to have full moral status must itself be understood as limited under a principle I call *variabilism* [and post-publication the *Loss Distinction Thesis*]. Thus to say that a person who never exists relative to a given world has full moral status is to say that diminutions in wellbeing—*losses, harms*—that person incurs at worlds where that person does or will exist have full moral significance. But it *isn't* to say that diminutions in wellbeing—*losses, harms*—that person incurs at worlds where that person never exists have moral significance. Similarly, our own parents' failure to do well by us at those worlds where they have brought us into existence or indeed *will* bring us into existence counts as a wrong since the losses we incur at those worlds as a result of those failures are incurred at worlds where we do or will exist. But it would have been perfectly permissible for our parents never to have brought us into existence to begin with since the losses we incur as a result of that sort of “failure” are incurred at worlds where we never exist.

Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem, co-edited with David Wasserman (Springer 2009)

Collection of new papers addressing some of the most interesting and important theoretical problems in the area of population ethics (16 contributors total).

Child Versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law (Rowman & Littlefield 1998)

This book describes a handful of person-affecting principles and applies those principles to practical problems in normative and population ethics, including the nonidentity problem, human cloning and wrongful life.

Reviewed by Michael F. Goodman, *Ethics* 110,3 (2000) 636-38 (“This is a fun book to read; sometimes maddening, sometimes puzzling, but fun. The comparing of cases, the application of principles, and the attention Roberts gives to some of the details hold one’s attention. Best of all, I learned from it”); Peter Vallentyne, *Nous* 34,4 (2000) 634-48 (“In *Child Versus Childmaker*, Roberts provides an enlightening analysis and a cogent defense of a version of the person-affecting restriction in ethics All future discussion of the person-affecting intuition will need to take her work into account”); Stephen Holland, *Jo. of Applied Philosophy* 17,2 (2000) 231-33 (“Roberts’ . . . arguments are sophisticated but accessible”); Axel Gosseries, *Ethics in the Environment* 6,2 (2001) 114-18 (“. . . Roberts' book is a model of clarity and refinement. The reader will find there enlightening discussions on concepts such as merely possible and future people, on Broome's inconsistency argument against the person-affecting view, on wrongful life . . . This is a great book of philosophy!”).

Articles

All articles are single-authored with the exception of “Dividing and Conquering the Nonidentity Problem” (coauthored with David T. Wasserman).

Articles—Published, forthcoming, under review

“The Nonidentity Problem,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (revised entry due March 2024)

“Population, Existence and Incommensurability,” *Philosophical Studies* (paper accepted with minor changes; changes made and paper resubmitted)

“Incommensurability, Intuition and Existence,” *Proceedings of Climate Ethics and Future Generations* (Vol. V) (Institute for Futures Studies Preprint Series 2023)

<https://www.iffs.se/en/publications/working-papers/studies-on-climate-ethics-and-future-generations-vol-5/>

“The Person Based Intuition and the Better Chance Puzzle,” *The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics*, eds. Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist and Tim Campbell (Oxford University Press, 2022)

“The Value and Probabilities of Existence,” *Existence and Ethics* eds. Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich and Keton Ramakrishnan (Oxford University Press, 2022). Pp. 38-60

“Anonymity and Indefinitely Iterated Addition and Reversal,” *Proceedings of Climate Ethics and Future Generations*, eds. Paul Bowman and Joe Roussos (Vol. IV) (Institute for Futures Studies 2021). Pp. 221-237

<https://www.iffs.se/en/publications/working-papers/studies-on-climate-ethics-and-future-generations-vol-4/>

“Does Climate Change Put Ethics on a Collision Course with Itself?” *Proceedings of Climate Ethics and Future Generations*, eds. Paul Bowman and Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (Vol. III), (Institute for Futures Studies 2021). Pp. 197-220

<https://www.iffs.se/en/publications/working-papers/studies-on-climate-ethics-and-future-generations-vol-3/>

“Consequentialism and Population Ethics,” *The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism*, ed. Douglas Portmore (Oxford University Press 2020). Pp. 474-497

“What Is the Right Way to Make A Wrong a Right?” *Proceedings of Climate Ethics and Future Generations*, eds. Paul Bowman and Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (Vol. II) (Institute for Futures Studies 2020)

<https://www.iffs.se/en/publications/working-papers/studies-on-climate-ethics-and-future-generations-vol-2/>

“Parfit, Population Ethics and Pareto Plus,” *Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry (Reading Parfit Part II)*, ed. Andrea Sauchelli (Routledge 2020)

“Why Wear Blinders? Boonin and the Narrow Approach to the Nonidentity Problem.” Book symposium, David Boonin, *The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People in Law, Ethics and Philosophy* (ed. Erik Magnusson) vol. 7 (2019) pp. 102-126

<https://www.raco.cat/index.php/LEAP>

“The Nonidentity Problem” (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 2019).

<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonidentity-problem/>

“Population,” *International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Wiley-Blackwell 2019)

“Nonidentity Problem,” *International Encyclopedia of Ethics*. Wiley-Blackwell (2019)

“When Does the Worth-Having Existence Make Things Better?” *Proceedings of Climate Ethics and Future Generations*, eds. Paul Bowman and Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (Vol. I) (Institute for Futures Studies, 2019), pp. 27-41

<https://www.iffs.se/en/publications/working-papers/studies-on-climate-ethics-and-future-generations-vol-1/>

“Getting Clear on Why the Benefits of Existence Do Not Compel Us to Create” (peer commentary), *The American Journal of Bioethics* 17(8) (2017), pp. 18-21

“Is a Person-Affecting Solution to the Nonidentity Problem Impossible? Axiology, Accessibility and Additional People,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (special issue *Ethics and Future Generations*, ed. Rahul Kumar) 47(2-3) (2017), pp. 200-228

“Dividing and Conquering the Nonidentity Problem,” with David Wasserman, in *Current Controversies in Bioethics*, eds. Matthew Liao and Collin O’Neil (Routledge 2017), pp. 81-98

“Population Axiology,” *Oxford Handbook of Value Theory*, eds. Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson (Oxford University Press) (2015), pp. 299-323

“Temkin's Essentially Comparative View, Wrongful Life and the Mere Addition Paradox,” *Analysis* 74 (2) (2014), pp. 306-326.

“Can Procreation Impose Morally Significant Harms or Benefits on the Child? And So What If It Can?” (American Philosophical Association, *Philosophy and Medicine Newsletter* April 2014)

“The Nonidentity Problem” (substantial revision of prior entry) (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 2013)

“The Nonidentity Problem,” *International Encyclopedia of Ethics*, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Wiley-Blackwell 2013)

“Population Ethics,” *International Encyclopedia of Ethics*, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Wiley-Blackwell 2013)

“Moral and Legal Constraints on Human Reproductive Cloning” (new title), in *Families: Beyond the Nuclear Ideal* eds. D. Cutas and S. Chan (Bloomsbury 2012)

“Does the Nonidentity Problem Imply a Double Standard for Physicians and Patients?” Response to Hope and McMillan, *American Journal of Bioethics* (2012)

“The Asymmetry: A Solution,” *Theoria* 77 (2011) 333-367

“An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation,” *Philosophy Compass* 6/11 (2011) 765-776

“Harming in the Multiple Agent Context,” *Ethical Perspectives* 18 (2011) 313-340

“The Nonidentity Problem and the Two-Envelope Problem: When Is One Act Better for a Person than Another?” in *Harming Future Persons*, eds. Roberts and Wasserman, Springer (2009) 201-228

“Harming Future Persons: An Introduction,” co-authored with David Wasserman, in *Harming Future Persons*, eds. Roberts and Wasserman, Springer (2009), pp. viii-xxxviii.

“What Is the Wrong of Wrongful Disability? From Chance to Choice to Harm to Persons,” 28(1) *Law and Philosophy* (2009; on line 2008) 1-57

“The Nonidentity Problem” (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 2009)

“The Nonidentity Fallacy: Harm, Probability and Another Look at Parfit’s Depletion Example,” *Utilitas* 19 (2007) 267-311

“Supernumerary Pregnancy, the Problem of Collective Harm and the Nonidentity Problem,” *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* 34.4 (2006) 776-792

"Supernumerary Pregnancy and the Limits of the Constitutional Privacy Guaranty," *Jo. of Philosophical Research* (2005) 105-117

“Person-Based Consequentialism and the Procreation Obligation,” *The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays in Population Ethics*, eds. J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (Springer 2004) 99-128

“Harm to Offspring,” published in The American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics (ASMLE) 28th Annual Conference for Health Law Teachers (Newark, June 2004) Conference Syllabus (June 2004)

"Is the Person-Affecting Intuition Paradoxical?" *Theory and Decision* 55.1 (2003) 1-44

"Can It Ever Have Been Better Never to Have Existed at All? Person-Based Consequentialism and a New Repugnant Conclusion," *Jo. of Applied Philosophy* 20.2 (2003) 159-85

"A New Way of Doing the Best That We Can: Person-Based Consequentialism and the Equality Problem," *Ethics* 112.2 (2002) 315-50

“Human Cloning: A Case of No Harm Done?” *Dylematy bioetyki (Dilemmas of Bioethics)*, A. Alichniewicz and A. Szczesna (eds. and trans.), Lodz Academy of Medicine (2001)(translated from 1996 article)

"Cloning and Harming: Children, Future Persons and the 'Best Interest' Test," *Notre Dame Jo. of Law, Ethics & Public Policy* 13.1 (1999) 37-61

“Human Cloning: A Case of No Harm Done?” *Jo. of Medicine and Philosophy* 21.5 (1996) 537-54

“Parent and Child in Conflict: Between Liberty and Responsibility,” *Notre Dame Jo. of Law, Ethics and Public Policy* 10.2 (1996) 485-542

“Present Duties and Future Persons: When Are Existence-Inducing Acts Wrong?” *Law and Philosophy* 14.3/4 (1995) 297-327

“Sexual Harassment, the Acquiescent Plaintiff and the ‘Unwelcomeness’ Requirement,” in D. Bushnell, ed., *Nagging Questions* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1995) 105-21

“A Way of Looking at the Dalla Corte Case,” *Jo. of Law, Medicine and Ethics* 22.4 (1994) 339-42

“Good Intentions and a Great Divide: Having Babies by Intending Them,” *Law and Philosophy* 12.3 (1993) 287-317

“Distinguishing Wrongful From ‘Rightful’ Life,” *Jo. of Contemporary Health Law and Policy* 6 (1990) 59-80

“Lewis’s Theory of Personal Identity,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61.1 (1983) 58-67

Reviews—Published

Review of Rivka Weinberg, *The Risk of a Lifetime* (Oxford 2016) *Ethics* 127(2) (2017) 512-517

Review of Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, *Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement* (Oxford University Press 2012) *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 13(6) (2016) 751-754

Review of Nils Holtug, *Persons, Interest and Justice* (Oxford University 2010) *Utilitas* 26(4) (2014) 483-486. Top tier publisher; peer-reviewed invited submission

Review of Tim Mulgan, *Future People* (Oxford University Press), *Mind* 116(463) (2007) 770-775. Top tier publisher; peer-reviewed invited submission

Selected Lectures and Talks

Participant book symposium, MacAskill’s *What Do We Owe the Future?* American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings (New York Jan. 2024)

“Ethics on a Collision Course with Itself—or Just Another Puzzle for Us to Solve?” Invited lecture, Institute for Futures Studies Climate Ethics and Future Generations (Stockholm, Sept. 2023).

“The Puzzle of the Procreative Asymmetry.” Keynote for Buffalo University Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Saturday Workshop (Buffalo, New York Apr. 2023)

McMahan’s “‘It Might Have Been!’: Abortion, Prenatal Injury, and What Matters in Alternative Possible Lives.” Invited comments. University Center for Human Values, Princeton University (Oct. 2022)

“What Is the Problem with Moral Philosophy?” *What Is the Point of Moral Philosophy?* Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. Conference in honor of Ingmar Persson. Organized by Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson (Oxford July 2022)

“Population, Existence and Incommensurability.” Incommensurability Conference. Organized by Nir Eyal and Anders Herlitz (Center for Population-Level Bioethics, Rutgers University, May 2022)

“Why Population Ethics Should Reject the Principle of Anonymity.” Formal Ethics Conference Series. Organized by Paul McNamara (Jan. 2022). International conference (virtual)

“Should Social Choice Theory Abandon the Principle of Anonymity?” Invited lecture, Uppsala University (Uppsala Nov. 12, 2021) (virtual)

“Anonymity and the Case of the Indefinitely Iterated Addition and Reversal.” Workshop on Complaints, Institute for Futures Studies (Stockholm, June 2021)

“What Is the Right Way to Make a Wrong a Right?” Workshop on the Nonidentity Problem. Institute for Futures Studies (Stockholm, Feb. 2020)

“Does Climate Change Put Ethics on a Collision Course with Itself?” Conference on Sustainability and Future People, Umeå University (Umeå, Sweden, Feb. 2020)

“A Person-Based Approach to the Repugnant Conclusion,” guest speaker for Professor Singer’s Practical Ethics, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University (Oct. 16, 2019)

Conference on Climate Change and Future Generations. Discussant. Institute for Futures Studies (Stockholm Sept. 26-28, 2019)

“Population Ethics and the Ethics of Procreation,” Population and Procreative Ethics (workshop), Princeton University. Organized by Johann Frick and Tina Rulli (Princeton May 11-12, 2019)

“Does the Additional Worth-Having Existence Make Things Better? Rutgers University (Value Theory Reading Group) (New Brunswick April 11, 2019)

“Is Climate Ethics on a Collision Course with Itself?” Conference on Population, Public Policy and Climate. Organized by *Politics, Philosophy and Economics* (Tulane University March 15-16, 2019)

"Nonidentity and Fertility: When Does a Choice Create a Better Chance of Existence?" Climate Ethics and Future Generations, Workshop on Uncertainty. Institute for Futures Studies (Stockholm Dec. 6-7, 2018)

“Does the Worth-Having Existence Make Things Morally Better?” Climate Ethics and Future Generations, Kick Off Conference, Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm (Sept. 27-29, 2018)

“The Better Chance Puzzle, the Nonidentity Problem and the Value of Existence.” Conference on the Philosophical Legacy of Derek Parfit. Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies (ISUS) Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). Germany (July 2018)

“The Better Chance Puzzle and the Value of Existence,” Oxford Parfit Conference. Oxford University (May 18-20, 2018) (organizer Jeff McMahan/Corpus Christie College)

“The Nonidentity Problem and the Value of Existence,” American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings, Savannah, Georgia (Jan. 2018)

“Why Are Commercial Surrogacy and Baby-Selling Wrong?” Comment on Eric Chwang, “Commercial Surrogacy as Less Objectionable Baby-Selling,” University Center for Human Values, Princeton University (Decamp Series) (Sept. 2017)

“Axiology, Accessibility and Nonidentity,” Conference on New Work in Population Ethics, Duke Center for Law, Ethics and Public Policy (April 2017)

“Is a Person-Affecting Solution to the Nonidentity Problem Impossible?” Binghamton University (SPEL colloquium)(February 2017)

“The Nonidentity Problem,” Workshop on Deontological Stances on the Nonidentity Problem, Institute for Futures Studies (Stockholm May 2016)

Comment on “Why Procreators Have No Special Obligations,” Axel Gosseries and Nicholas Vrousalis, University Center for Human Values DeCamp Seminar, Princeton University (Feb. 2016)

“The Procreative Asymmetry in Ethics and the Law,” American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings (Committee on Philosophy and Law of the APA)(session speakers include David Heyd, David DeGrazia and Johann Frick) (Washington D.C. Jan. 2016)

“The Neutrality Intuition,” Conference on Population Ethics (Future of Humanity Institute/project on Population Ethics: Theory and Practice) (organized Hilary Greaves and John Cusbert) (Oxford University Nov. 2015)

“The Neutrality Intuition,” Princeton University Center for Human Values Fellows Seminar (Oct. 2015)

“Dividing and Conquering the Nonidentity Problem” (with David Wasserman) NYU Bioethics Workshop (New York May 2015). Contributions of the two authors evenly divided (50%-50%)

“Modal Ethics,” Annual Meetings of the Society for Applied Ethics (Oxford June 2014)

“Rethinking ‘Mere Addition’: Can Adding Happy People Make Things Worse?” American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meetings (San Diego, April 2014)(comment on Temkin’s *Rethinking the Good*)

“Can Procreation Impose Morally Significant Harms or Benefits on the Child?” American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings (Dec. 2013)

Comment on Tim Campell, “Infinite Utility and Cain’s Paradox,” Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (RoME V) August 2012

Comment on Howard Nye, “Responsibility for Vulnerability and the Non-Identity Problem,” American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meetings (Mar. 2013)

“Variabilism and the Asymmetry,” University of Tennessee at Knoxville (Oct. 2011)

“The Person-Affecting Approach in Ethics,” super-seminar presentation, University of Tennessee at Knoxville (Oct. 2011)

"Variabilism and the Asymmetry," Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (RoME IV) (Aug. 2011)

“Procreative Reasons, Procreative Obligation and Procreative Liberty,” Dubrovnik ethics conference (June 2011)

"A Variabilist Solution to the Asymmetry," Philamore Ethics Reading Group (Mar. 2011)

“Early Abortion and the Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons,” Stockholm University (Dec. 2010)

“The Asymmetry and Genetic Enhancement,” Workshop on Justice and Reproduction, Nordic Network for Politics and Ethics (University of Gothenburg, Nov. 2010)

“Early Abortion and the Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons,” University of Copenhagen (Nov. 2010)

"Causing Harm in the Multiple Agent Context," Université catholique de Louvain, International Bernheim Workshop (Oct. 2010)

Workshop on the Nonidentity Problem – Three hour presentation – Université catholique de Louvain (Oct. 2010)

Comment on Saul Smilansky's "Should We Be Sorry We Exist?" Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (RoME III) (Aug. 2010)

"Does the Moral Status of Merely Possible Persons Imply that Early Abortion Is Wrong?" Poster presentation, Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (RoME III) (Aug. 2010)

"Does the Moral Status of Merely Possible Persons Imply that Early Abortion Is Wrong?" Society for Applied Philosophy, Oxford (July 2010)

Comment on John Broome, "Climate Change: How Bad Is the Chance of Catastrophe?" DeCamp Seminar (University Center for Human Values, Princeton University, Mar. 2010)

"An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation: Can It Be Permissible Not to Bring the Happy Child into Existence Yet Obligatory to Leave the Miserable Child Out of Existence?" Conference on What Do We Owe to Future Persons, Goethe University (Frankfurt, Feb. 2010)

"Procreation, Abortion and Harm," comment on Dillard, Harman, Kamm and McMahan, Committee on Philosophy and Law, American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings (Dec. 2009)

"Does the Moral Status of Merely Possible Persons Imply that Early Abortion Is Wrong?" New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association (Montclair State University, Nov. 2009)

"Counting the Costs Before They're Hatched: Climate Change, the Nonidentity Problem and the Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons," Conference on the Ethics of Climate Change: Intergenerational Justice and the Global Challenge, University of Delaware Department of Philosophy and the American Philosophical Association (Oct. 2009)

"Do Principles of Justice Extend to Merely Possible Persons?" Conference, Extensions of Justice, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Mount Scopus, June 2009)

Comment on Holly Smith, "Error and Uncertainty in Moral Decision-Making," Felician Ethics Conference (Apr. 2009)

Comment on Rivka Weinberg, "Existence: Who Needs It?" DeCamp Seminar, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University (Nov. 2008)

"Abortion and the Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons," University of Delaware at Newark (Nov. 2008)

"The Nonidentity Problem and the Two Envelope Problem," University of California at Riverside (Feb. 2008)

"Climate Change and the Problem of Collective Harm," comment on Andrew Light, Society for Applied Philosophy, Princeton Theological Institute (Oct. 2007)

"Expected Value, the Nonidentity Problem and the Two-Envelope Problem," New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association Meetings (Mar. 2007)

Comment on Larry Temkin, "Equality and Health Care," University Center for Human Values, Princeton University (Sept. 2006)

"When Do We Harm People by Causing Them To Exist? Expected Value, Betterness and the Slave Child Case," University Center for Human Values, Princeton University (Oct. 2006)

"Supernumerary Pregnancy and Harm to Persons," Center for Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania (Hart Lecture, June 2006)

"Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Harm to Offspring," American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics (ASMLE) 28th Annual Conference for Health Law Teachers (Newark, June 2004)

Comment on Noam J. Zohar, "Divine Representations and the Value of Embryos: God's Image, God's Name and the Status of Human Non-Persons," Center for Judaic Studies and University Center for Human Values, Princeton University (Apr. 2004)

Comment on David Wasserman, "Is Every Birth Wrongful? Is Any Birth Required?" University Center for Human Values, Princeton University (Mar. 2004)

"The New Reproductive Technologies and the Limits and Structure of Constitutional Privacy," American Philosophical Association – Pacific Division Meetings (San Francisco, Mar. 2003)

Comment on Adrienne Asch, "Selling of Human Ova," University Center for Human Values, Princeton University (2002)

“The Structure of Constitutional Privacy: The ‘Right’ To Be Left Alone As a Hierarchy of Critical Privacy Interests,” American Society for Value Inquiry (Milwaukee Apr. 2002)

“Person-Based Consequentialism and the Equality Problem,” American Philosophical Association – University of Delaware, Ethics in the Twenty-First Century (Newark, Del., Nov. 2001)

“Am I As Good As You Are? Two Forms of Consequentialism and Two Approaches to the Equality Problem,” American Philosophical Association – Pacific Division Meetings (Oakland Apr. 2001)

“Cloning and Harming,” American Philosophical Association – Pacific Division Meetings (Oakland Apr. 1999)

“Is the Person-Affecting Intuition Inconsistent?” American Philosophical Association – Pacific Division Meetings (Oakland Apr. 1997)

“The Nonidentity Problem,” Lawrence University (1995)

“Human Cloning – A Case of No Harm Done?” Meetings of the New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association (1995)

“When Do Existing-Inducing Acts Harm?” Meetings of the New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association (1993)

Recent Teaching at the College of New Jersey

Introduction to Logic (PHL 120)

Philosophy of Law (PHL 275)

Law and Ethics (PHL 375)

Advanced Ethics (PHL 430)

Senior projects and theses (PHL 4XX)

Other Teaching Interests

Metalogic; History of Modern Philosophy; Seminar in Population Ethics; Seminar in Torts and Ethics; Constitutional Law and Ethics; Contemporary Moral Issues; Honors teaching; First Seminar

ADVISING

Academic Advising—Philosophy

As a member of the Department of Philosophy, Religion and Classical Studies, I advise 6-10 philosophy majors on a regular basis.

Academic and professional advising—Prelaw

As Coordinating Prelaw Advisor for the College and Chair of the Prelaw Advisory Committee, I advised on an initial basis 100-120 prelaw students each year. I have also designed the novel Designated Prelaw Advising system, accepted and implemented by the committee, that ensures that each potential prelaw student has a designated prelaw advisor (DPA) during their years at the College and beyond.

To my knowledge, the College is unique in its design and implementation of the DPA system.

SERVICE TO THE COLLEGE, THE SCHOOL AND THE DEPARTMENT

Service to the College

Faculty advisor for the Prelaw Society, June 2014-

Faculty advisor for College chapter of the ACLU, May 2014-

Coordinating Prelaw Advisor for the College, Jan 2014-

Member of the Pre-Law Advisory Committee, 1993-

Member of College Committee for the Intellectual Community, 2004-2010.

Member of Steering Committee for the Dawley Center for the Study of Social Justice, 2003-; inactive though still member since fall 2013 due to other responsibilities

Member of Faculty Senate, 2005-2008 and 1998-2001

Member of Dahne Committee for Prize for Program Excellence, 2005-07

Member of Committee on Academic Practices, 2005-07

Member of Middle States Subcommittee on Institutional Assessment, 2004-05

Member of Human Subjects Review Board, 2000-03

Women and Gender Studies, Member of the Executive Board, 1996-2005

Service to the Department

Coordinator of lectures in philosophy and related areas, including by Peter Singer, Erik Carlson, Larry Temkin, David Wasserman, Mark Green, Alan Krueger, Fred Feldman

Chair of Department of Philosophy, Religion and Classical Studies, June 2012-June 2018 (sabbatical leave 2015-2016). Elected by department; approved by dean and provost

Acting Chair of Department of Philosophy and Religion, fall 2007 and spring 2003

SERVICE TO THE PROFESSION

Journal Participation

Member of Editorial Board, *Journal of Applied Philosophy* (Dec. 2018-)

Associate Editor, *Journal of Applied Philosophy* (July 2013-Nov. 2018)

Associate Editor, *Ethical Perspectives* (Jan. 2011-)

Referee for *Nous*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophy Compass*, *Journal of Applied Philosophy*; *Ethics*; *Philosophical Quarterly*; *Journal of Ethics*; *Economics and Philosophy*; *Bioethics*; *Ethics*; *Journal of Social Philosophy*; *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*; *Journal of Moral Philosophy*; *Social Theory and Practice*; Oxford University Press; Rowman & Littlefield; *Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics*

External Evaluations

External evaluator, tenure decision Howard Nye (University of Alberta 2015)

External evaluator, tenure decision Rivka Weinberg (Scripps 2014)

External evaluator, Timothy Newton-Howes, *Rectifying Historical Injustice* (masters thesis), The University of Melbourne (Sept. 2013)

Evaluator, Dani Attas, Grant Application to The Israel Science Foundation (March 2012)

External evaluator, Janet Malek, application for tenure, East Carolina University Medical School (2010)

External evaluator, Stockholm University Postdoctoral Research Fellow (2009)

American Philosophical Association

Chair, American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Law, June 2012-June 2015

Coordinator of session for the Committee on Philosophy and Law on Kimberly Kessler Ferzan's Berger Prize winning paper, "Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible," American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meetings (San Francisco Apr. 2013)

Coordinator of session for the Committee on Philosophy and Law on "Abortion, Procreation and Harm," American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings (New York Dec. 2009).

Member, Committee on Philosophy and Law of the American Philosophical Association, 2008-2011

Other

Society for Applied Philosophy, Oct. 2007-; American Philosophical Association, Feb. 1993-; Advisory Board of Women's Research and Education Institute (WREI), 1999-; Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs, Member of the Executive Board, 1995-; New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association, Member of the Executive Board, 2000-.

Periodic membership in last several years: New Jersey State Bar Association; American Society for Law, Medicine and Ethics; International Economics and Philosophy Association; Association for Children of New Jersey; American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy

Collaborator and member of the advisory board for proposal under Care for the Future (Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), Oxford University

REFERENCES

On request.